

VZCZCXRO5368  
PP RUEHAST  
DE RUEHTA #1922/01 151012Z  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
P 310122Z MAY 06 ZDK  
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5540  
INFO RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 7588  
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 2451  
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ASTANA  
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2105  
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS  
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0029

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ALMATY 001922

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE), ISN/CTR

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [KZ](#)  
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: SECOND ROUND OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING  
DISCUSSIONS

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11. (SBU) SUMMARY: Following up on their February meeting, the U.S. outreach delegation, augmented by IAEA and European Commission representatives, met in Astana May 25 with a Kazakhstani delegation comprising 14 representatives from seven ministries and organizations. The sides reached provisional agreement on a document laying out the key steps to improve Kazakhstan's anti-smuggling capabilities, as well as a list of priority assistance projects derived from that document. The MFA will vet the document and the project list with two organizations that were absent from the discussions before providing final agreement. END SUMMARY.

12. (SBU) RESULTS OF MEETING. The nuclear smuggling outreach delegation met in Astana on May 25 with a Kazakhstani delegation representing seven ministries and organizations. (See para. 6 for a list of participants.) The meeting focused on negotiating a joint document laying out the priority needs for improving Kazakhstan's capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling, including those areas where existing efforts should be continued and new efforts undertaken. The sides went through each section of the U.S. draft in detail and made a number of changes to the language of the document. The most significant substantive changes involved removing specific mentions of Customs and border guards in the section on corruption in favor of more general language, and removing the section on revising Customs procedures in response to input from the Kazakhstani side that such revisions are already ongoing. The sides reached provisional agreement on the document (text in para. 4), with the Kazakhstani side saying they would need to have it reviewed by the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) and the Ministry of Health (MOH, which has a significant role in overseeing the use of radioactive materials in medicine), which were not represented at the meeting, before it could be considered finalized. Upon conclusion of the joint document, the Kazakhstani side reviewed a U.S.-drafted list of priority assistance projects for Kazakhstan, which was derived from the joint text. The Kazakhstani side suggested one additional project, assistance to support "liquidation" of radioactive sources rather than their extended secure storage. The U.S. side agreed to look into the feasibility of this option, once the Kazakhstani side provides additional information about the number and type of sources they would propose to liquidate. Otherwise, the project list was provisionally agreed, again with the understanding that it would still need KAEC and MOH review. (See para. 5 for the projects list.)

13. (SBU) NEXT STEPS. The U.S. side agreed to have the Embassy translate the revised joint document and provide it to the MFA, along with the English version that was provided in the meeting, for review by the MOH and the KAEC. These organizations will also review the project list. In response to a question from the Kazakhstani side whether it would be possible to add projects to this list, the U.S. side emphasized that any additions should be consistent with the already agreed joint document. Lastly, the Kazakhstani side agreed to provide information on the number of radioactive sources that it proposes to be liquidated. The U.S. side agreed to review the feasibility of source "liquidation", and if feasible, include this as a project to be pitched to international donors. The U.S. side also indicated that it would begin its outreach to international donors as soon as the Kazakhstani side provides final agreement on the joint document and projects list. Both sides agreed to remain in communication regarding commitments of assistance from international donors to ensure that any such assistance is closely coordinated between the relevant experts from the GOK, the U.S., and the donors.

14. (SBU) Begin text of communique:

Communique of U.S. and Kazakhstani Delegations on Intentions to Improve Kazakhstan's Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Delegations of the Governments of the United States of America and Kazakhstan met in Astana on February 24 and May 25, 2006, to discuss the capabilities of Kazakhstan to combat the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. The U.S. delegation included representatives from the Department of State, Department of Energy, Department of

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Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence Community, U.S. Embassy, International Atomic Energy Agency, and European Commission. The Kazakhstani delegation included representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, National Security Committee, and Kazatomprom. As a result of their discussions, the delegations reached a common understanding on the need to continue existing efforts and undertake additional efforts to improve Kazakhstan's anti-smuggling capabilities, as described below.

#### PREVENTION

##### Physical Protection

###### Continue Existing Efforts:

- Complete discussions with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on the question of repatriating or downblending HEU from research reactors and converting reactors to LEU where technically feasible
- Finish implementing the plan for long-term storage of the BN-350 spent fuel

###### Additional Efforts Needed:

- Begin long-term planning to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of the security systems installed through cooperation under the U.S.-Kazakhstan Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Agreement
- Conduct periodic vulnerability assessments at facilities with dangerous nuclear and radioactive materials to ensure their security remains adequate as threats evolve

##### Regulatory Infrastructure

###### Continue Existing Efforts:

- Complete work between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee

(KAEC) to draft amendments to regulatory laws and then examine implementing regulations for any needed revisions to support the IAEA Code of Conduct

--Continue cooperation with the IAEA on development of rules on security and classification of radioactive sources

--Continue progress in meeting the IAEA Model Project milestones

--Continue improvement of systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials

#### Additional Efforts Needed:

--Develop proposals to toughen sanctions for violators of nuclear and radiological safety and security rules

--Adapt inspection procedures to verify radioactive sources in the registry for the Ministry of Health, which conducts many of these inspections. Additional training or support for the Ministry of Health regional offices may be needed.

#### Securing Orphaned Sources

##### Continue Existing Efforts:

--Implement the Orphan Sources Recovery Strategy developed by the Atomic Energy Committee and the Nuclear Technology Safety Center

--Continue work with the DOE Search and Secure Program to identify high-risk locations for orphan radioactive source materials

##### Additional Efforts Needed:

--Work cooperatively to identify facilities and locations at a high risk for the presence of orphan radioactive source materials

--Conduct searches of these facilities and identify and secure orphan sources that have been located

#### DETECTION

##### Border security

##### Continue Existing Efforts:

--Work jointly with the DOE Second Line of Defense (SLD) team to determine equipment and establish priorities for site installations at Kazakhstani points of entry

--Work jointly with the DOE/SLD team on training of Customs and other officials on the operation and maintenance of

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radiation detection equipment installed at points of entry and response to alarms

--Continue working with the EXBS program to conduct border security enforcement training throughout the country and deploy additional equipment

--Continue efforts to incorporate WMD detection and interdiction into the standard training curriculum for customs officers and border guards

--Continue working with the Department of Defense (DoD) on the Caspian Sea Maritime Project conducted under the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative Program

##### Additional Efforts Needed:

--Deploy equipment and conduct training at points of entry identified by Kazakhstani Customs and DOE/SLD that are not addressed by the SLD program, in close coordination with Kazakhstani Customs and DOE to ensure compatibility of equipment

#### RESPONSE

##### Prosecution

##### Continue Existing Efforts:

--Continue efforts to arrest and prosecute nuclear smugglers to the full extent of the law, when such cases arise

##### Additional Efforts Needed:

--Raise(aw!remes{\$amongjudkcIal au|loRi|is gboet thedYfe%rs f~wb,ui 3qg\in,  
nuclear smuggling and prosecuting smugglers  
--Exchange operational data with the U.S., as appropriate  
and through appropriate channels, on individuals or groups  
involved in smuggling, methods used by smugglers, and any  
connections with terrorism or organized crime  
--Continue cooperation among the law enforcement and other  
agencies responsible for combating nuclear smuggling in  
Central Asian states  
--Continue coordination among Central Asian states on border  
security

Additional Efforts Needed:

--Kazakhstan could host international meetings and  
conferences on combating nuclear smuggling. There have  
already been a number of valuable conferences and workshops  
regarding various elements of the fight against nuclear  
smuggling in Central Asia, so any additional conference  
should have a focus and expected outcomes that do not  
duplicate previous conferences and workshops.  
--Improve reporting to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database  
Program  
--Announce smuggling convictions in the press  
--Share aggregate smuggling data with the U.S., including  
the total number of smuggling cases detected, the number of  
arrests, and the number of suspects convicted and jailed

CORRUPTION

Continue Existing Efforts:

--Continue U.S. outreach efforts with Kazakhstani agencies  
on integrity awareness  
--Continue work with OSCE and UNODC anti-corruption projects

Additional Efforts Needed:

--Develop specific plans to combat potential corruption,  
possibly including:  
-Incorporating anti-corruption/integrity awareness  
training into standard training curricula  
-Expanded use of automatic monitoring technologies,  
such as radiation monitors that automatically transmit  
alarms and anomalies to redundant and/or central locations.  
This approach is being planned for SLD installations.

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The delegations anticipate that the results of their joint  
efforts will contribute significantly to improvement in  
Kazakhstan's ability to combat the smuggling of nuclear and  
radioactive material.

Astana  
May 25, 2006

End text of communique.

15. (SBU) Begin text of Possible Projects document (note  
internal numbering)

Possible Assistance Projects to Address Kazakhstan's  
Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear  
Smuggling

Regulatory Infrastructure  
Need:

In July 2005, the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC)  
compiled a registry of more than 14,000 radioactive sources  
currently in use in Kazakhstan, with assistance from the  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This registry was  
based primarily on compiling paper records and entering  
those into a database. Many of these records are out-of-  
date, so compiling an accurate list requires conducting  
inspections to verify the contents of the registry. The  
KAEC has already conducted a large number of these  
inspections, but the Ministry of Health (MOH) has  
jurisdiction for radioactive sources in use for medical

applications. The KAEC and MOH are working closely together to address this problem. U.S. NRC only works with KAEC.

#### Possible Project:

A new project could help adapt inspection procedures developed by the KAEC to verify radioactive sources in the registry for the MOH, which conducts these inspections at medical facilities. Conducting regular inspections to update and maintain the radioactive source registry should be integrated into the basic regulatory responsibilities of the MOH. The MOH maintains regional offices throughout the country that need additional training and support to effectively conduct these inspections.

#### Securing Orphaned and Unregistered Sources

##### Need:

Kazakhstan continues to discover a significant number of "orphaned" or abandoned sources. In addition, industrial, medical, and other facilities may have disused radioactive sources that remain unregistered and improperly secured. These sources could be dangerous if smugglers discover them before they are appropriately secured. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), through its Search and Secure Program, provided the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) with equipment and training to identify facilities most likely to have large numbers of disused radioactive sources, conduct targeted searches, and safely dispose of the prioritized vulnerable sources. DOE and KAEC identified four sites likely to have disused sources. The first of these searches recovered and secured a large number of sources. DOE is planning to sponsor one additional Search and Secure mission, but lacks the budgetary resources to support all the needs in Kazakhstan.

#### Possible Project:

Additional project(s) are needed to fund missions to proactively search, locate, characterize and secure orphan radioactive sources at high-risk facilities in Kazakhstan. This project would require that the GOK work cooperatively with the project team to identify locations at high risk for orphan sources through literature and record searches. The project would then provide technical and financial (e.g., local salaries, transportation costs, per diem) assistance to the GOK to competently search and clear this location(s) of orphan radioactive source materials. A western nuclear agency could also share valuable experience by helping the KAEC conduct these searches. For interested donors without existing implementing mechanisms for such assistance, partnering with DOE and/or the IAEA could provide a mechanism to support these activities in Kazakhstan. Technical and financial support of search missions would ensure that high-risk facilities are cleared of orphan radioactive materials and are given a high priority.

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#### DETECTION

##### Border security

##### Need:

Kazakhstan is the ninth-largest country in the world in area and the only Central Asia country bordering Russia. Its extensive borders, limited radiation detection equipment at border crossings, and limited training of border security personnel in detecting nuclear and radioactive materials presents a significant vulnerability. Several USG programs are active in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan recently signed an Implementing Arrangement with DOE on cooperation under the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program. A typical suite of equipment delivered by the SLD program includes stationary radiation portal monitors, handheld radiation detection equipment for secondary inspections, and related communications equipment and training. Portal monitors are generally linked to a central alarm station to connect border personnel to technical

experts if needed and to reduce the opportunities for corruption. The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program has been working in Kazakhstan for more than five years on improving all areas of the country's export control system, including delivering nonproliferation-related training and enforcement equipment. DoD is working with Kazakhstan to improve maritime security in the Caspian Sea.

#### Possible Projects:

¶1. Augment Ongoing Efforts to Improve Detection Capability at Kazakhstan's International Borders  
DOE/SLD is already working with Kazakhstani Customs to re-validate sites (land border crossings, international airports and seaports) that were identified several years ago to be of mutual interest for the deployment of radiation detection systems under the SLD program. In addition, the EXBS program is conducting border security enforcement training throughout the country and deploying additional equipment, particularly along the Russian border. Prospective international donors interested in supporting deployment of radiation detection equipment at Kazakhstan's international borders should work in close coordination with Kazakhstani Customs and existing USG assistance providers to ensure consistency in equipment and compatibility with communications systems.

¶2. Improving Security at Green Borders, particularly on the Russian Border  
Many areas between established points of entry have little or no security, which presents a significant vulnerability that could be exploited by smugglers. The flat terrain along the Russian border and established points-of-entry that in some cases are more than 100km apart offer few obstacles to illegal crossing. This also makes remote monitoring of this border a possibility, but Kazakhstan does not have the appropriate technology to make this a reality. Roads are also limited in many of these areas, so four-wheel-drive vehicles and snowmobiles are needed to adequately patrol many areas of the border. Additional vehicles, communications equipment, portable radiation detection equipment, remote sensing equipment, and training would help border guards better patrol these areas to prevent smuggling.

#### RESPONSE

##### Prosecution

##### Need:

Though Kazakhstan has strong criminal laws on nuclear smuggling and shown a willingness to prosecute offenders, in a few cases involving small amounts of radioactive materials, suspects were convicted and given suspended sentences. While these incidents did not involve proliferation-significant quantities of nuclear material, they were typical of the opportunistic, profit-driven smuggling incidents common in the region. Without effective deterrence, these individuals or others could "graduate" into more serious forms of smuggling. These cases perpetuate the belief that smuggling nuclear and radioactive materials can be very profitable and may encourage

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additional thefts of these materials. All criminals involved in smuggling should receive significant jail time, regardless of material actually smuggled.

##### Possible Project:

International experts could help educate judges and prosecutors on the dangers of nuclear smuggling and encourage stricter sentences, even for smugglers caught with small amounts of radioactive material.

##### Sponsoring International Cooperation in Nuclear Forensics

##### Need:

The international nuclear forensics and attribution community benefits from wide participation and especially appreciates participation of States with significant experience in this area. Kazakhstan is a state with significant knowledge of nuclear chemistry, forensics, and attribution, and it has very capable facilities to support nuclear forensics and attribution investigations. In recent years, Kazakhstan has not participated consistently in the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG), an important forum that hosts this discipline. The ITWG meets yearly, encourages forensic scientists and law enforcement bodies to participate, and conducts nuclear forensic exercises using actual material. Consistent and enduring participation would help ensure that all international resources available are technically current and practiced to support each other in the event of a significant nuclear smuggling case or investigation.

**Possible Project:**

If resources are the primary issue regarding non-participation, we envision that a donor country or the IAEA could sponsor the time and travel for several Kazakhstani scientists and law enforcement personnel to participate in ITWG activities for the upcoming year. This would include attendance at the ITWG-12 in the fall of 2006, participation in the annual Exercise, and participation in ITWG Working Groups. Based on U.S. experience, this effort would cost approximately \$50K for one year. Participation would prevent a perceived stagnation and isolation of an otherwise capable and necessary entity.

**CORRUPTION**

**Need:**

Though there has been some considerable improvement recently, corruption in Kazakhstan remains a serious problem and could undermine Kazakhstani and international efforts to improve capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling. Corruption among Customs officials and border guards is a particular concern, since bribes could be paid to overlook smuggling or avoid radiation detection equipment.

**Possible Project:**

Projects to address potential corruption among Customs officials and border guards could include incorporating anti-corruption/integrity awareness training into the standard curriculum for these agencies, helping develop standardized risk analysis models for determining what is searched, automatic monitoring technologies, like radiation monitors that report hits to headquarters, and increased pay for border security personnel. It would be particularly useful for a donor to help Kazakhstan integrate various anti-corruption efforts and develop a comprehensive plan to address corruption among Customs officials and border guards.

End text of Possible Projects document.

**16. (U) List of U.S. participants:**

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Mark Aronoff, International Atomic Energy Agency



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ASQUINO